??
中國(guó)為何支持新能源汽車
中國(guó)汽車業(yè)高管通常不會(huì)在例行的行業(yè)簡(jiǎn)報(bào)中暗示南中國(guó)海爆發(fā)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的可能性。然而，比亞迪(BYD)董事長(zhǎng)王傳福上月在推出該公司最新款電動(dòng)汽車時(shí)就這么做了，這款汽車是該公司與德國(guó)戴姆勒(Daimler)聯(lián)手組建的合資公司開發(fā)的。
在被問到他為何對(duì)全球最大汽車市場(chǎng)的電動(dòng)汽車前景感到樂觀時(shí)，王傳福提出，政府政策支持將是一個(gè)關(guān)鍵的成功因素，這在一定程度上受到中國(guó)對(duì)于“兩個(gè)60%”擔(dān)憂的推動(dòng)。
中國(guó)現(xiàn)在每年的石油需求有60%左右依靠進(jìn)口，其中60%通過南中國(guó)海運(yùn)輸，在南中國(guó)海，未經(jīng)沙場(chǎng)的解放軍海軍正試圖投射實(shí)力，逼退菲律賓、越南和美國(guó)等對(duì)手。
“南中國(guó)海是一個(gè)非常復(fù)雜的問題，”王傳福表示，他指的是該地區(qū)可能引發(fā)沖突并破壞海上交通的領(lǐng)土爭(zhēng)端。“如果船舶無(wú)法運(yùn)送石油，那么中國(guó)將面臨嚴(yán)重的石油短缺。”
今年夏季，中國(guó)政府推出新的、補(bǔ)貼力度加大的激勵(lì)舉措，以促進(jìn)“新能源汽車”的開發(fā)，其中還有其他原因，最突出的是污染。但王傳福辯稱，地緣政治擔(dān)憂是出臺(tái)面向替代能源汽車的政策支持的最大因素。
他表示：“石油安全是推動(dòng)新能源汽車發(fā)展的最重要因素，”他補(bǔ)充稱，李克強(qiáng)總理今年3月宣布“向污染宣戰(zhàn)”是“第二個(gè)推動(dòng)因素”。
王傳福擅長(zhǎng)推銷，顯然，他強(qiáng)調(diào)可能推升比亞迪股價(jià)的因素對(duì)自己是有好處的，特別是在今年該公司汽油動(dòng)力汽車銷量大幅下滑的情況下。但他的分析是值得關(guān)注的。政界人脈遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)強(qiáng)于跨國(guó)車企外籍高管的中國(guó)汽車業(yè)高管，很少在公開場(chǎng)合分享他們對(duì)于中國(guó)政府動(dòng)機(jī)以及較長(zhǎng)期目標(biāo)的洞見。
比亞迪董事長(zhǎng)的政治敏感也要好于多數(shù)人。
除了在一個(gè)政府主導(dǎo)的行業(yè)成為一個(gè)成功的民營(yíng)企業(yè)家（比亞迪最初是一家手機(jī)電池制造商，后來(lái)進(jìn)軍汽車業(yè)）以外，王傳福還有一些不尋常的合作伙伴。
他的最大投資者之一是李祿，李祿曾在1989年天安門廣場(chǎng)學(xué)生抗議活動(dòng)中擔(dān)任學(xué)生領(lǐng)袖。在抗議遭到流血鎮(zhèn)壓后，李祿逃往美國(guó)，最終成為一名億萬(wàn)富翁基金經(jīng)理。這位前民主活動(dòng)人士早早發(fā)現(xiàn)了比亞迪的潛力，并把王傳福介紹給他的偶像沃倫•巴菲特(Warren Buffett)，巴菲特控股的中美能源(MidAmerican Energy Holdings)現(xiàn)在是比亞迪最大單一股東。
中國(guó)對(duì)新能源汽車的需求一直不旺，主要是因?yàn)闈撛谲囍鲗?duì)充電站的覆蓋率感到擔(dān)憂。中國(guó)的新能源汽車保有量只有7萬(wàn)輛左右，其中多數(shù)為公交車或出租車。這表明，中國(guó)政府制定的到明年銷售50萬(wàn)輛以及到2020年銷售500萬(wàn)輛新能源汽車的目標(biāo)將很難實(shí)現(xiàn)。
然而，王傳福表示，政府決心實(shí)現(xiàn)目標(biāo)，不僅因?yàn)槿绻ㄍ袞|油田的海上運(yùn)輸線被切斷，中國(guó)希望擁有一支可以繼續(xù)運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)的車隊(duì)。他表示，中國(guó)政府擔(dān)心，盡管本土汽車行業(yè)可能為全球規(guī)模最大，但并非全球?qū)嵙ψ顝?qiáng)。外國(guó)品牌主宰著中國(guó)市場(chǎng)。
王傳福表示，新能源汽車將給中國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)汽車廠商提供另一條奪取行業(yè)主導(dǎo)地位的途徑。這并非他一人的觀點(diǎn)。
最近，中國(guó)歐盟商會(huì)(EU Chamber of Commerce in China)表示擔(dān)心，針對(duì)新能源汽車的政府補(bǔ)貼和激勵(lì)舉措只適用于那些“在中國(guó)生產(chǎn)的中國(guó)品牌”汽車。這意味著，核心技術(shù)必須向中國(guó)當(dāng)局披露。
中國(guó)歐盟商會(huì)汽車工作組在一份意見書中表示：“一方面，（新能源汽車）旨在緩解中國(guó)對(duì)進(jìn)口石油的依賴，另一方面，（政府政策）是自主電動(dòng)車產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展的一份藍(lán)圖，有朝一日可能會(huì)取代跨國(guó)（汽車制造商）的主導(dǎo)地位。”
意見書提出，中國(guó)政府的戰(zhàn)略愿景忽視了一個(gè)事實(shí)：“汽車行業(yè)長(zhǎng)期全球化……這有利于所有經(jīng)濟(jì)參與者以及消費(fèi)者。”
如果中國(guó)對(duì)21世紀(jì)能源安全的追求被陳舊的保護(hù)主義本能的削弱，那將是具有諷刺意味的。
China’s global woes spark hope for electric car sector
Chinese auto executives do not usually allude to the possibility of a shooting war in the South China Sea in the course of otherwise routine industry briefings. Yet Wang Chuanfu, chairman of BYD, did just that last month during the launch of the company’s latest electric car, developed by its joint venture with Daimler of Germany.
Asked why he was optimistic about electric vehicles in the world’s largest automotive market, Mr Wang argued that government policy support would be a critical factor in success, driven in large part by Beijing’s concerns about “the two 60 per cents”.
China now imports about 60 per cent of its annual oil requirement and 60 per cent of those imports are shipped through the South China Sea, a region wher the untested People’s Liberation Army Navy is trying to project power and push back its Philippine, Vietnamese and US rivals.
“The South China Sea is a very complicated problem,” Mr Wang said, referring to the region’s territorial disputes that could potentially spark a conflict and disrupt maritime traffic. “If ships could not deliver their oil China would face severe shortages.”
There are other reasons the Chinese government this summer issued new and improved incentives to spur development of so-called NEVs, or new energy vehicles, most notably pollution. But Mr Wang argued that geopolitical concerns loomed largest in its formulation of policy support for alternative energy vehicles.
“Oil security is the biggest driver for NEV development,” he said, adding that Premier Li Keqiang’s “war on pollution”, declared in March this year, was “the second driver”.
Mr Wang is a good salesman and clearly has an interest in highlighting forces that may drive up BYD’s share price, especially given a collapse in sales of its gasoline-fuelled cars this year. But his analysis is worth paying attention to. Chinese auto executives, who are far better connected than their expatriate counterparts at multinational car companies, rarely share their insights on Beijing’s motivations and longer-term objectives in public settings.
BYD’s chairman also has better tuned political antennas than most.
In addition to succeeding as a private entrepreneur in a state-dominated industry – BYD began as a manufacturer of mobile phone batteries before diversifying into cars – Mr Wang also has rather unusual partners.
One of his largest investors is Li Lu, a student leader during the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. After those ended in bloodshed, Mr Li fled to the US and ended up a billionaire fund manager. The former democracy activist spotted BYD’s potential early and introduced Mr Wang to his idol, Warren Buffett, whose MidAmerican Energy Holdings is now the biggest single shareholder in the company.
Chinese demand for NEVs has been tepid, largely because of drivers’ concerns about the availability of an adequate charging infrastructure. There are only about 70,000 NEVs in use in China, most of them public buses or taxis. That suggests the government’s target of 500,000 NEV sales next year and 5m by 2020 will be difficult to reach.
But Mr Wang said the government was determined to succeed – and not just because it wants a vehicle fleet that can keep running even if maritime lifelines to Middle East oilfields were to be cut off. Beijing, he said, is concerned that while its auto industry may be the world’s largest, it is not the strongest. Foreign brands dominate the market.
According to BYD’s chairman, NEVs offer China’s domestic auto companies an alternative route to industry dominance. He is not alone in this view.
Yesterday, the EU Chamber of Commerce in China expressed concern that government subsidies and incentives for NEVs only apply to those “produced in China under a Chinese brand”. That means underlying technologies have to be disclosed to local authorities.
“While at one level [NEVs] are meant to alleviate China’s dependency on imported oil, on another, [government policy] is a blueprint for the development of an indigenous electric vehicle industry that might one day trump the dominant position of multinational [car companies],” the chamber’s automotive working group said in a position paper.
It argued that Beijing’s strategic vision ignores the fact that “the automotive industry has long been highly globalised . . . in ways that benefit all economic players as well as consumers”.
It would ironic if China’s 21st century quest for energy security was undermined by old-fashioned protectionist instincts.
Tom Mitchell is the Financial Times’ Beijing correspondent
（更多資訊請(qǐng)關(guān)注中國(guó)進(jìn)出口網(wǎng)）
Asked why he was optimistic about electric vehicles in the world’s largest automotive market, Mr Wang argued that government policy support would be a critical factor in success, driven in large part by Beijing’s concerns about “the two 60 per cents”.
China now imports about 60 per cent of its annual oil requirement and 60 per cent of those imports are shipped through the South China Sea, a region wher the untested People’s Liberation Army Navy is trying to project power and push back its Philippine, Vietnamese and US rivals.
“The South China Sea is a very complicated problem,” Mr Wang said, referring to the region’s territorial disputes that could potentially spark a conflict and disrupt maritime traffic. “If ships could not deliver their oil China would face severe shortages.”
There are other reasons the Chinese government this summer issued new and improved incentives to spur development of so-called NEVs, or new energy vehicles, most notably pollution. But Mr Wang argued that geopolitical concerns loomed largest in its formulation of policy support for alternative energy vehicles.
“Oil security is the biggest driver for NEV development,” he said, adding that Premier Li Keqiang’s “war on pollution”, declared in March this year, was “the second driver”.
Mr Wang is a good salesman and clearly has an interest in highlighting forces that may drive up BYD’s share price, especially given a collapse in sales of its gasoline-fuelled cars this year. But his analysis is worth paying attention to. Chinese auto executives, who are far better connected than their expatriate counterparts at multinational car companies, rarely share their insights on Beijing’s motivations and longer-term objectives in public settings.
BYD’s chairman also has better tuned political antennas than most.
In addition to succeeding as a private entrepreneur in a state-dominated industry – BYD began as a manufacturer of mobile phone batteries before diversifying into cars – Mr Wang also has rather unusual partners.
One of his largest investors is Li Lu, a student leader during the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. After those ended in bloodshed, Mr Li fled to the US and ended up a billionaire fund manager. The former democracy activist spotted BYD’s potential early and introduced Mr Wang to his idol, Warren Buffett, whose MidAmerican Energy Holdings is now the biggest single shareholder in the company.
Chinese demand for NEVs has been tepid, largely because of drivers’ concerns about the availability of an adequate charging infrastructure. There are only about 70,000 NEVs in use in China, most of them public buses or taxis. That suggests the government’s target of 500,000 NEV sales next year and 5m by 2020 will be difficult to reach.
But Mr Wang said the government was determined to succeed – and not just because it wants a vehicle fleet that can keep running even if maritime lifelines to Middle East oilfields were to be cut off. Beijing, he said, is concerned that while its auto industry may be the world’s largest, it is not the strongest. Foreign brands dominate the market.
According to BYD’s chairman, NEVs offer China’s domestic auto companies an alternative route to industry dominance. He is not alone in this view.
Yesterday, the EU Chamber of Commerce in China expressed concern that government subsidies and incentives for NEVs only apply to those “produced in China under a Chinese brand”. That means underlying technologies have to be disclosed to local authorities.
“While at one level [NEVs] are meant to alleviate China’s dependency on imported oil, on another, [government policy] is a blueprint for the development of an indigenous electric vehicle industry that might one day trump the dominant position of multinational [car companies],” the chamber’s automotive working group said in a position paper.
It argued that Beijing’s strategic vision ignores the fact that “the automotive industry has long been highly globalised . . . in ways that benefit all economic players as well as consumers”.
It would ironic if China’s 21st century quest for energy security was undermined by old-fashioned protectionist instincts.
Tom Mitchell is the Financial Times’ Beijing correspondent
（更多資訊請(qǐng)關(guān)注中國(guó)進(jìn)出口網(wǎng)）
